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Abstract: Foreign investment management firms have recently started to play
a major role in the investment trust business in Japan. In terms of assets
under management, their size and market share have almost doubled in the
past several years. In part, the relative success of foreign managed firms in
attracting market share may be attributed to the fact that Japanese
investment trusts have underperformed benchmarks in quite a dramatic
fashion over the past two decades. This is at best indirect evidence that
Japanese funds underperform their foreign counterparts. In a recent paper
(Brown, Goetzmann, Hiraki, Otsuki and Shiraishi 2001) we show that the
underperformance can be attributed almost entirely to the unique tax
environment of Japanese investment trusts, which had the effect of heavily
penalizing early withdrawals. The relaxation of these regulations coincided
with a major inflow of new money into the investment trust business. We
examine the relative performance of Japanese and foreign investment
management firms before and after this change in tax regulations, and find
that the poor relative performance of Japanese funds from April 2000 through
December 2001 may in part be attributed to  the huge inflow of new money
into this sector and the style shifts made necessary to accommodate this flow. 
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I. Introduction
The investment trust business in Japan has grown very substantially over the last few
years. Assets of open-type equity funds grew 82 percent from January 1998 to their
maximum value of ¥164 Trillion on May 2, 2000, falling to ¥143 Trillion by the end of
2001, a net increase of 58 percent over the entire period.  In the period from January
1998 to January 2000 alone assets of open-type equity funds grew by 61 per cent. As
indicated in Figure 1, a large part of that increase can be attributed to the increase in
assets under management by foreign owned investment trusts. As illustrated in Figures
2, 3 and 4, foreign investment management firms have recently started to play a major
1From January 23, 1998 to December 28, 2001 the number of foreign managed
trusts grew from 184 to 490, including 28 funds jointly owned by Japanese and
foreign interests. The market share of foreign managed funds also increased from
16.8% of assets under management in 1998 to 25.7% by the end of  2001.
2Merrill’s investment trust business grew from ¥1.31Billion to ¥4.40Billion in
assets under management from 1998 to 2000 with the acquisition of Yamaichi’s
franchise. However, their asset management affiliate, Yamaichi Asset Management
was purchased by Société Générale and is starting to attain significant market share
as SG Yamaichi Asset Management.
3This underperformance was documented in Cai, Chan and Yamada (1997).
These authors were careful in the way they explained their findings. However
journalists were quick to attribute this poor relative performance to mismanagement
by Japanese investment trust managers with articles such as “Japanese investment
trusts: Punting in the dark” (Economist January 22, 1994). 
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role in the investment trust business in Japan. Over the period from 1998 to 2000 their
market share almost doubled1, with more than 71 per cent of this growth coming from
net inflow of funds, particularly in 1998 (Figure 5). Most of this increase in market share
can no doubt be traced to aggressive marketing by foreign owned firms. The success of
this marketing effort is evident in Figures 3 and 4 which show how many new foreign
firms have entered the market. Fidelity in particular has very quickly obtained a
significant market share. This market share has come at the expense of traditional firms
like Nomura and Daiwa. Another reason for the increase in foreign market share is the
purchase by foreigners of traditional Japanese asset managers2.  However, at least part
of this increased market share can be attributed to the fact that  Japanese  investment
trusts have underperformed benchmarks in quite a dramatic fashion over the past two
decades3. 
4This view is common in other Asian countries. Kim (2002) observes that the
widespread view that foreigners are simply more skillful than domestic investors
leads many in Korea and elsewhere to adopt “follow the foreigner” investment
strategies.
5Bae, Ito and Yamada (2001) show that there is empirical evidence that foreign
traders not governed by Japanese corporate accounting rules can take advantage of
limited trading opportunities of local investors. It is not clear that this attribute is
shared by foreign owned institutions operating within Japan and subject to Japanese
law and regulations, competing against domestically owned investment trusts.
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This widely publicized fact has shaken public confidence in the industry, the third
largest investment trust business in the world outside of the United States and France.
There is a widespread perception that foreign managers are simply more skillful than
their Japanese competition.4 Kamesaka, Nofsinger, and Kawakita (2002) document that
foreign traders in the Japanese equity market were able to profit from their trading
activities there as the market fell through the 1990's. Some have argued, for example,
that it is difficult for Japanese investors to compete with foreign traders who can exploit
opportunities that arise from institutional differences between local and home markets.5
On the other hand, foreign owned investment trusts operate in the same markets, are
subject to the same regulatory environment, and employ large numbers of Japanese and
Japanese trained managers. It would be strange indeed to find that foreign investors
could systematically overcome the informational advantage of their domestic
competition. In fact, a close analysis of the data for Korea and elsewhere confirms that
domestic traders do well in small or illiquid investments where we would expect the
informational asymmetry to be most severe (Kim (2002)). Foreign investors were
quicker to react to the downturn in the markets in Japan in 1990 than were the
6Both Cai, Chan and Yamada (1997) and Brown, Goetzmann, Hiraki, Otsuki,
and Shiraishi (2001) document the features of this adverse tax regime.
7Initially, this regulatory change was to go into effect for all investment trusts.
However, bond funds were given an additional year to comply with the new
regulations due to the perceived complexity of introducing market value-based
accounting standards for many low liquidity unlisted corporate bonds.
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domestic investors (Kamesaka, Nofsinger, and Kawakita (2002)), but this does not
necessarily speak to their longer term superiority, and may suggest instead that they
typically follow naive trend-following strategies. 
The fact that Japanese investment trusts underperform established benchmarks does
not necessarily show that Japanese funds underperform their foreign counterparts.  In
a recent paper (Brown, Goetzmann, Hiraki, Otsuki and Shiraishi 2001 ) (BGHOS) we
show that the reported underperformance can be attributed almost entirely to the
unique tax environment of Japanese investment trusts. In 1966 tax regulations were
introduced that had the effect of heavily penalizing early withdrawals from investment
trusts6. It is fair to say that these regulations significantly inhibited the growth of the
investment trust industry.  In March 1998 the Japanese Cabinet recommended for
legislation "The Three-Year Implementation Plan on Public Administrative
Deregulations," which included a revision of investment trust tax treatment to conform
with international standards, to come into effect on April 1, 20007. In addition to
revising the tax treatment of investment trusts, this legislation allowed investment
trusts to incorporate in a manner similar to US mutual funds. The relaxation of these
5regulations coincided with a major inflow of new money into Japanese managed
investment trusts, amounting to ¥27.7 Trillion from January to December 2000. This
amount represents 26.3 percent of the assets of Japanese investment trusts as of the
beginning of the year. Unfortunately, a very large majority of this new money (91.7
percent) flowed into Japanese general equity accounts which peaked in value
coincidently with the change in tax regulations, and subsequently lost 25 percent in
value on an annualized basis up to December 28, 2001.  
The increased market share of foreign investment management firms in Japan from
1998 to the present allows a direct test of the hypothesis of foreign superiority in the
investment management business. Foreign investment trusts have taken a significant
market share of the Japanese investment trust industry in the last four years. For this
reason,  it is possible to analyze their relative performance in the same investment
environment by analyzing week by week returns. Contrary to popular perception
Japanese managers did not underperform their foreign competition in the period of our
data from January 23, 1998 through December 28, 2001. While Japanese investment
trusts ended up with a loss of 5 percent over the entire period, this loss was
indistinguishably different from the annualized value weighted geometric return of
negative  4.3 percent experienced by foreign managers over the same period (Figure 6).
We will find the same pattern of returns even after controlling for sector allocations  by
Japanese investors outside the control of Japanese managers. However, in no case are
6the returns significantly different from foreign managers, after controlling for style of
management. The evidence suggests that Japanese managers happened to be in the
right place at the right time as the market rose. But then, victims of their own success,
they were burdened with massive fund inflows just as the markets were turning against
them.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the data and methodology used
in our analysis.    Section III reports the results.  The conclusion discusses the
implications of our findings and directions for future research.
II Data and Methodology
II.1 Data
The data used in our study derives from a database of daily fund valuations provided by
QUICK Corporation for 3072 open-type funds from January 23, 1998 through December
28, 2001. Total fund values are given as well as net asset value per share (NAV). From
this data are constructed 205 weekly holding period rates of return. Returns are
computed using NAV computed  at the end of each week as well as dividends paid during
that week, per unit of the investment trust contract. QUICK Corp. also provided the
thirty-two narrowly classified Investment Trust Association (ITA) categories. As in
BGHOS (2001) we use this data to construct 11 broader classifications separately
7breaking out Bull and Bear derivative funds using the Monthly Report for December
2001 issued by Kinyu Data Systems (KDS), which is basically the same as the one used
by the ITA. For the purpose of benchmark comparison we use a money market rate
based on the end of week percentage return quoted for three month Japanese CD’s, a
Japanese domestic fixed income return given as the percentage weekly change in the JP
Morgan Japanese Government Bond Index (denominated in Yen), a Japanese domestic
equity return given as the percentage weekly change in TOPIX index, and finally a
foreign equity return given as the percentage change in the end of week MSCI World
Equity Index excluding Japan converted into Japanese yen.
II.2 Methodology
Following BGHOS (2001) two distinct methods of analysis were used to study the
performance attributes of investment trusts currently operating in Japan. In the first
place we use a returns-based classification algorithm developed in Brown and
Goetzmann (1997) [BG] to group the Japanese funds in our sample into a few
parsimonious categories.  This procedure is referred to as “Generalized Style
Classification” (GSC). The objective of this procedure is to use past returns to determine
a natural grouping of funds that has some predictive power in explaining the future
cross-sectional dispersion in fund returns. If there are K such styles the ex post total
return in period t for any fund j can be represented as:
8Observe that is equivalent to where
allowing for time varying expected return and beta that are
conditional on multivariate factor realizations It.
9To see this, note that the style benchmark given as the value-weighted
average return 
within each style category,  , is an unbiased estimator of the true
expected return
conditional on the factor realizations as of date t: .
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where  is the expected return for style J conditional upon the factor realization  8.
If the idiosyncratic return component  has zero mean ex ante and is uncorrelated
across securities, the classification into styles will suffice to explain the cross-sectional
dispersion of fund returns to the extent that :Jt  differs across styles. The algorithm used
in BG assigns funds to styles in such a way as to maximize the explanatory power of this
equation, allowing for time-varying and fund-specific residual return variance. As
explained in BGHOS (2001) this procedure accounts for tax dilution effects to the extent
that the tax dilution effect is common across funds in a particular style and hence
impounded in . Note that this approach also justifies the common procedure of
forming style benchmarks for performance evaluation by value-weighting returns within
each style category9.
Once funds are allocated to styles, it is possible to determine the source of returns by
examining the relationship between style benchmark returns  and  proxies for factor
9realizations . This regression corresponds to a procedure developed in Sharpe (1992),
and recently applied to mutual funds (Brown and Goetzmann, 1997) and hedge funds
(Fung and Hsieh, 1997). In this method, passive indices are used in a multi-factor linear
model as benchmarks.  The model constrains weights on these passive indices to be
positive and sum to one, while also allowing an unconstrained intercept.
We can then infer time-varying expected return and sensitivity of the benchmark to
factors using   and  .
Although we do not replicate the “conditional” performance measurement procedures
(c.f. Ferson and Schadt, 1996), we do allow for time-varying exposure  to factors both by
allowing the value weights wjt to change and by estimating the model using only 12
weeks of data. However, since implied sensitivity is assumed constant over three
months, this technology may not credit managers with timing skill. For this reason, the
use of style benchmarks is preferable to this regression-based approach to performance
10
measurement.
III. Results
Contrary to popular perception, Japanese funds significantly outperformed their foreign
competition over the period from 1998 through the first quarter of 2001, but since then
their performance has been disappointing. The relative performance of Japanese and
foreign funds is presented in Figure 6, with the Japanese  firms earning an annualized
total return of negative 5 percent over the entire period from January 23, 1998 through
December 28, 2001, indistinguishably different from the negative 4.3 percent for foreign
firms over the same period.   
As noted before much of the difference in returns between Japanese and foreign funds
can be attributed to the pattern of funding by Japanese investors, leading to a
significant overweighting in the General Equity sector, which did particularly poorly in
the period post March 31, 2000. While most of the investment in Japanese investment
trusts represented new money, examination of the pattern of return/flow correlations
reveals that at least part of the investment in the General Equity sector prior to March
31, 2001 came at the expense of investments in Balanced Funds during this period
(Table 1). However, post March 31, 2000, flows appear more to be driven by
contemporaneous returns, consistent with herding in the Japanese markets. Indeed, the
pattern of return/flow correlations before and after March 31, 2000 suggest a significant
10Prior to March 31, 2000, the correlation between flows to Japanese General
Equity accounts was negatively correlated to flows into Japanese Balanced funds
(-0.2364 ) and foreign Balanced funds (-0.3404) significant at the five and one percent
levels respectively. The correlation between foreign General Equity and Balanced
fund flows is even more pronounced (correlation -.5391). Subsequent to March 31,
these correlations decreased (only the Japanese General Equity flows have a
significant negative correlation. In the period post March 31, fund flows appear to be
more significantly driven by recent return history in the General Equity and
international sectors, judging from the highly significant  fund flows appear to be
significantly related to returns in General Equity and International sectors. The
inference that Japanese investors are herding on the basis of returns can be found in
the fact that Bull and Bear fund flows are complementary, and are highly correlated
with contemporaneous returns on General Equity and Index accounts (see Brown,
Goetzmann, Hiraki, Shiraishi and Watanabe (2002)).
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change in investor behavior before and after this date10
To examine in some greater depth the differences between Japanese and foreign owned
funds, we examined the time-varying sensitivity of Japanese funds and foreign funds to
four asset classes found to be useful benchmarks of Japanese fund investment
performance in BGHOS (2001). To do this we regressed fund returns on these four asset
class returns constraining the sum to equal one, allowing for a constant term. Japanese
and foreign implied asset weights were obtained as a weighted average of individual fund
coefficients, where the weights were based on the asset value of each fund. These
weights were computed on the basis of rolling six week intervals of the data, and the
results plotted as Figures 7 and 8. Inspection of these Figures reveals that there are
distinct differences between Japanese and foreign funds. The Japanese implied asset
allocation is reasonably stable over the entire time period. A little more than 60 percent
of Japanese funds are invested in Japanese domestic equity, with the remaining shares
11To analyse the differences between Japanese and foreign General Equity
accounts we considered a Sharpe style analysis based on monthly reported Nikko
Style Indices, Large Growth, Large Value, Small Equity and MicroCap allowing also
for a cash component. The average Sharpe coefficients based on non-overlapping 6
month intervals of the data were quite different for Japanese and foreign General
Equity classified funds. While the largest implied weight (Large Growth) was about
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equally divided between foreign equity, domestic fixed income and money market asset
classes, although the percentage invested in domestic equities has declined about 10
percent during 2001.  On the other hand, there is considerable time variation in the
foreign-owned sector asset allocations. Foreign-owned funds were invested about equally
in fixed income and equity securities, with about a 10 per cent allocation to Japanese
equities in 1998. However, as illustrated in Figure 8, the domestic equity share rose to
approximately 50 percent of the total by the end of 1999, with the allocation remaining
stable through the remainder of the period, with a slight decline in domestic equity
weighting to the end of the period. In fact, the implied asset allocations of both
domestically managed and foreign managed funds appear to be converging over time.
The fact that Japanese aggregate asset allocations appeared to remain relatively
constant  throughout the period of our study does not necessarily imply consistency in
style of management. The broad aggregate asset class allocation may easily obscure
changes in allocation within each asset class. For example, Japanese General Equity
funds appear to differ significantly from foreign managed funds included within the
same ITA classification, with a greater orientation to value stocks. In addition, they
were less fully invested in the market over the sample period11. To the extent that
the same at 52 percent for both, the foreign funds had a larger average exposure to
Small Equity and MicroCap benchmarks (14.71 percent and 13.36 percent
respectively, as opposed to 10 percent and 8.09 percent for Japanese funds), and a
smaller exposure to value stocks (13.53 percent as opposed to 18.58 percent for
Japanese firms). Japanese managed firms were less invested in the market, with an
average implied cash position of 10.96 percent as opposed to 6.94 percent for foreign
firms.
12There is evidence of an additional tax based Limited style in the data prior to
the tax law change in March 31, 2000.
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BGHOS (2001) identified at least one style of Japanese management to be related to the
specific details of the investment trust tax procedures, we would expect changes in style
to occur in anticipation of the tax law changes that came into effect on April 1, 2000. We
examined the asset management style using style benchmarks derived by the GSC
procedure described in the previous Section, and by traditional style benchmarks. We
find that the asset management styles of Japanese-owned funds were distinctly different
from the styles of foreign-owned funds, and that these styles changed over the period of
study.
We applied the Brown and Goetzmann algorithm to weekly return data for 3072  funds
with at least six weeks of data for the period January 23, 1998 through March 31, 2000,
and April 7, 2000 through December 28, 2000. We  were able to extract at most five
distinct management styles from this data12. These styles are quite distinct both in
terms of asset allocation and the way in which average allocations change through time.
In addition funds tend to group together that have a common fund management
ownership and stated fund objective.
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An analysis of this data suggests the following style identifications:
GSC1 Domestic Equity. The average implied Sharpe portfolio weight on
TOPIX is 85.6 percent. In terms of ITA classifications, this classification
has an average weight by value of 62.3 percent by value in General
Equity funds, and 18.8 percent in the Index classification
GSC2 Balanced. With an average Sharpe weighting of 17 percent debt, 36.4
percent TOPIX and 26.7 percent MSCI World Equity (ex Japan), 41
percent by value of these funds are classified as Balanced in the ITA
classification
GSC3    International. 79 out of 179 of these funds are classified as
International by ITA, and the Sharpe weights average 37.1 percent
MSCI ex Japan and 32.7 percent fixed income with a 14.2 percent
allocation to the Other category, consistent with a significant diversified
international exposure. In addition, foreign firms manage almost twice
as much money in this category as do Japanese managers (63.8 percent
by value as opposed to 35.8 percent). 
GSC4 Index. These funds have an average exposure of 82.6 percent exposure
to TOPIX and are passive vehicles, with 29.7 percent by value classified
as Index funds and 19.6% classified as Derivative funds. 
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GSC5 Income. Most of these funds have a heavy investment in fixed income
investments, with an average Sharpe weighting of only 11.5 percent in
TOPIX and MSCI ex Japan equities combined. 16.4 percent of these
funds are classified by ITA as “Money Pooled.”
In Figure 9 we illustrate the sensitivity of Japanese and foreign owned firms to these
style benchmarks. The fund returns are regressed on the five style benchmarks with
coefficients constrained to be positive and add to one, allowing for a constant term
(alpha), using twelve weeks of data. Not only are the allocations more detailed than in
Figures 7 and 8, these style benchmarks account for any non-stationarity caused by
market timing, and as explained in BGHOS (2001) account for tax-dilution effects. We
now see a clear picture emerging. The high returns of the Japanese managed funds up
to March 31, 2000 may be attributed to the fact that many index-type funds (GSC 4)
were changing style to active equity management (GSC 1). Subsequent to that date
however, many General Equity funds switched back to the more passive style (GSC4)
to accommodate the huge inflow of new funds as the TOPIX was falling, accounting for
a substantial shortfall in returns.
On the other hand, as illustrated in Figure 10, the relatively poor performance of the
foreign owned funds up to March 31, 2000 is partly to be explained by the fact that many
of these funds were switching from a broadly based International style (GSC3) in which
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they may have had a comparative advantage into the same narrowly focused domestic
Japanese equity style (GSC1) at the same time that Japanese managers were
concentrating on this style. Subsequent to March 31, the portfolio allocations have been
more stable, with a greater investment in cash and fixed income than the Japanese
managers. They were less exposed to the market as the market fell during that period.
A similar picture emerges when we do the analysis again using the more traditional style
benchmarks (Figures 11 and 12). In the case of the Japanese funds, the gradual shift
from General Equity to Index funds proceeded up to March 31, 2000, with a significant
style shift back to the passive Index style in April 2000 with the inflow of new money
into this sector. The allocation away from Japanese equity by foreign managed firms
subsequent to March 31 is more pronounced in these figures. 
In Table 3 we report performance measures for Japanese and foreign investment funds
given the two style benchmarks we have used. As noted before, these style benchmarks
account for any residual tax dilution effect, and also allow for the possibility that
managers adopt dynamic trading strategies that cause expected return and factor
exposures to vary through the estimation period. The estimation procedure also allows
for the possibility of style shift within each non-overlapping 12-week estimation period.
The results show that the high returns for Japanese investment trusts were associated
with positive performance in excess of style benchmarks over the 1998-2000 period,
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superior to but not significantly different from foreign manager performance over the
same period. Consistent with the performance numbers reported in Figure 6, the
positive abnormal performance was concentrated in 1999 through the first quarter of
2000. However, subsequent to that date, Japanese funds experienced significant
negative excess returns, amounting to negative 5 percent on an annualized basis. Much
of this negative performance occurred in the 12 weeks prior to May 19, 2000, the period
of the regulation changes that took place on March 31. In that period Japanese funds
experienced an excess return of negative 10 percent on an annualized basis, while
foreign funds had a negative excess return of almost 20 percent.
The negative excess returns appear to be associated with major style shifts that occurred
subsequently to the major inflow of new money into the investment trust business.
Figure 13 shows that the negative weekly excess return measured for the period March
3, 2000 to May 18, 2000 coincided with the large inflow of new funds into Japanese
investment trusts of ¥15 Trillion over the prior 12 week period. Across all funds, there
was a significant negative relationship between excess returns and prior 12 week net
fund inflow into the investment trust sector (t = -2.12). Since the evidence shows clearly
that both Japanese and foreign managers changed style significantly over the sample
period and are in fact becoming more similar, we should expect some differences in
excess return. These differences, such as they are, appear to be associated with the huge
inflow of funds into the sector during 2000.
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IV. Conclusion
Japanese investment trusts have underperformed benchmarks in quite a dramatic
fashion over the past two decades. This widely publicized fact has shaken public
confidence in the industry, the third largest investment trust business in the world
outside of the United States and France. It has also opened the door to foreign
competition, and foreign-owned funds increased in size more than 70 per cent from new
investments in 1998 alone. The perception is obviously that foreign owned funds are
more successful than their home-grown competition. If true, this result would be most
interesting indeed. In the past, foreign-owned funds specialized in international
investments for which they had some comparative advantage. But recently they have
been investing more heavily in the Japanese domestic equity market, and are employing
large numbers of Japanese managers to construct and monitor these portfolios. 
The fact that Japanese investment trusts underperform benchmarks is at best indirect
evidence that Japanese funds also underperform their foreign counterparts. In a recent
paper BGHOS (2001) show that the underperformance can be attributed almost entirely
to the unique tax environment of Japanese investment trusts. In this paper we examine
the relative performance issue directly by looking at week by week returns for the period
January 23, 1998 through to December 28, 2001. Contrary to popular perception,
Japanese managers did not underperform their foreign counterparts over this period of
time, and in fact significantly outperformed them in the months leading up to a major
19
change in tax regulations at the end of March 2000. Perhaps this indicates that Japanese
managers are more skillful. However, the excess return evidence suggests that they
happened to be in the right place at the right time, and the negative return subsequent
to March 2000 may in part be attributed to the huge inflow of new money into this
sector and the style shifts made necessary to accommodate this flow. Thus we attribute
the difference in performance to the asset allocation decision, rather than to any
different skill in selecting securities.
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Table 1:
Relationship between returns and fund flows to Japanese and foreign managed investment trusts, January 30, 1998 to
March 31, 2000
Returns Japan flows Foreign flows
Inter
national Balanced Index
Bull
Funds
Bear
Funds
General
Equity
Inter
national Balanced Index Bull Funds
Bear
Funds
General
Equity
Inter
national Balanced
Returns
General Equity  0.4543**  0.2332*  0.8664**  0.8019** -0.7760**  0.1114  -0.0998  -0.2237* -0.2440** -0.3185**  0.3830**  0.1056  -0.2019* -0.1583  
International  0.6613**  0.4340**  0.4612** -0.4256**  0.1185  -0.0482  -0.2717** -0.2631** -0.2951**  0.2189* -0.0221  -0.0725  -0.1882* 
Balanced  0.1785   0.1996* -0.1656   0.0890  -0.0420  -0.0875  -0.0868  -0.0289   0.0586  -0.1288  -0.0078  -0.1083  
Index  0.9738** -0.9386**  0.0699  -0.1382  -0.2618** -0.2262* -0.4517**  0.4910**  0.0457  -0.1947* -0.1335  
Bull Funds -0.9621**  0.0677  -0.1085  -0.2397* -0.2050* -0.4708**  0.5086**  0.0232  -0.1604  -0.1271  
Bear Funds -0.0189   0.1245   0.2330*  0.1779   0.4375** -0.4890** -0.0414   0.1559   0.1105  
Japan 
flows General Equity  0.0278  -0.0662  -0.2364* -0.0907  -0.0312   0.1743  -0.0309  -0.3404**
International  0.0565   0.0542   0.2232*  0.0028  -0.2321*  0.4382**  0.2589**
Balanced  0.2937**  0.2713** -0.0691  -0.1461   0.3292**  0.3065**
Index  0.4567** -0.3399** -0.1064   0.0648   0.2308* 
Bull Funds -0.5599** -0.2356*  0.2094*  0.2300* 
Bear Funds -0.1233  -0.0078   0.012  
Foreign
flows General Equity -0.3294** -0.5391**
International  0.4236**
This table reports the correlations between value weighted weekly total returns on ITA investment trust aggregates
(augmented by separately accounting for Bull and Bear funds), and fund flows into Japanese and foreign managed open
type investment trusts. These fund flows are defined as the total assets reported at week end within each fund aggregate
less the total assets reported as of the previous week augmented by the value weighted total return during the week.
Single asterisks denote significance at the 5 percent level, and double asterisks denote significance at the one percent level.
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Table 2:
Relationship between returns and fund flows to Japanese and foreign managed investment trusts, April 7, 2000 to
December 28, 2001
Returns Japan flows Foreign flows
Inter
national Balanced Index
Bull
Funds
Bear
Funds
General
Equity
Inter
national Balanced Index Bull Funds
Bear
Funds
General
Equity
Inter
national Balanced
Returns
General Equity  0.7464**  0.3397**  0.8968**  0.8364** -0.7638**  0.3886**  0.3237** -0.0832   0.0114  -0.0653   0.4639**  0.6197**  0.3218** -0.0216  
International  0.5481**  0.6286**  0.5964** -0.6240**  0.0874   0.4914**  0.0742  -0.0887  -0.0136   0.3987**  0.3082**  0.4443** -0.0972  
Balanced  0.4222**  0.4177** -0.3576**  0.2789**  0.2611*  0.1260  -0.0324   0.2661*  0.0422   0.1806   0.3593** -0.0808  
Index  0.9705** -0.8640**  0.4412**  0.2656* -0.1029  -0.0359  -0.0100   0.4311**  0.4893**  0.2953** -0.0111  
Bull Funds -0.9065**  0.3683**  0.2464* -0.1038  -0.0518  -0.0059   0.4235**  0.3956**  0.3043**  0.0230  
Bear Funds -0.2645* -0.2668*  0.0469   0.1123   0.1115  -0.4092** -0.2901** -0.3746**  0.0343  
Japan 
flows General Equity -0.0703  -0.2357*  0.2045   0.2122* -0.0523   0.5562** -0.1474   0.0713  
International -0.0017  -0.1573  -0.0003   0.2625*  0.0312   0.1700  -0.0360  
Balanced  0.0163  -0.2299*  0.0634  -0.0878   0.4658**  0.0484  
Index  0.3478** -0.2597*  0.2111* -0.1777   0.0574  
Bull Funds -0.5395**  0.1098  -0.1845   0.0294  
Bear Funds  0.0538   0.2083*  0.0712  
Foreign
flows General Equity  0.1386   0.0667  
International  0.2145* 
This table reports the correlations between value weighted weekly total returns on ITA investment trust aggregates
(augmented by separately accounting for Bull and Bear funds), and fund flows into Japanese and foreign managed open
type investment trusts. These fund flows are defined as the total assets reported at week end within each fund aggregate
less the total assets reported as of the previous week augmented by the value weighted total return during the week.
Single asterisks denote significance at the 5 percent level, and double asterisks denote significance at the one percent level.
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Table 3: Performance measures for Japanese and foreign owned funds 1998-2001
Five GSC Style benchmarks 11 Augmented ITA style benchmarks
12 week
period ending
Japanese
Funds Foreign Funds Difference
12 week
period ending
Japanese
Funds Foreign Funds Difference
24-Apr-98 -0.00% 0.07% -0.08% 24-Apr-98 0.04% 0.20% -0.17%
17-Jul-98 0.01% -0.10% 0.11% 17-Jul-98 0.01% 0.09% -0.08%
9-Oct-98 -0.22% -0.09% -0.13% 9-Oct-98 -0.14% -0.31% 0.18%
1-Jan-99 0.10% 0.03% 0.07% 1-Jan-99 0.05% 0.04% 0.02%
26-Mar-99 0.08% -0.03% 0.11% 26-Mar-99 0.04% -0.04% 0.08%
18-Jun-99 0.06% 0.02% 0.05% 18-Jun-99 0.05% -0.11% 0.16%
10-Sep-99 0.11% 0.04% 0.07% 10-Sep-99 0.04% -0.07% 0.12%
3-Dec-99 0.07% 0.01% 0.06% 3-Dec-99 0.08% -0.05% 0.13%
25-Feb-00 0.09% 0.09% 0.00% 25-Feb-00 0.17% 0.15% 0.02%
19-May-00 -0.20% -0.38% 0.18% 19-May-00 -0.06% -0.42% 0.36%
11-Aug-00 -0.04% 0.06% -0.10% 11-Aug-00 -0.04% 0.07% -0.11%
3-Nov-00 -0.00% -0.05% 0.05% 3-Nov-00 0.06% -0.04% 0.10%
26-Jan-01 -0.13% -0.05% -0.08% 26-Jan-01 -0.10% 0.06% -0.16%
20-Apr-01 -0.23% -0.03% -0.20% 20-Apr-01 -0.32% -0.03% -0.29%
13-Jul-01 -0.09% -0.03% -0.06% 13-Jul-01 0.04% 0.05% -0.01%
5-Oct-01 -0.07% 0.04% -0.10% 5-Oct-01 -0.02% 0.14% -0.16%
28-Dec-01 -0.01% 0.11% -0.13% 28-Dec-01 0.03% 0.16% -0.13%
24-Apr-98 to 
25-Feb-00
0.03%
(0.95)
0.00%
(0.15)
0.03%
(1.05)
24-Apr-98 to 
25-Feb-00
0.04%
(1.46)
-0.01%
(-0.22)
0.05%
(1.31)
19-May-00 to 
28-Dec-01
-0.10%
(-3.23)
-0.04%
(-0.79)
-0.05%
(-1.29)
19-May-00 to 
28-Dec-01
-0.05%
(-1.16)
-0.00%
(-0.02)
-0.05%
(-0.68)
24-Apr-98 to 
28-Dec-01
-0.03%
(-1.01)
-0.02%
(-0.65)
-0.01%
(-0.39)
24-Apr-98 to 
28-Dec-01
-0.00%
(-0.12)
-0.01%
(-0.17)
0.00%
(0.09)
Numbers in this table give the weighted average of alpha measured in units of weekly returns for all
funds in each ownership category, where the weights are proportional to the total assets under
management in each fund estimated for each of 17 non-overlapping 12 week periods 1998-2000. The
individual fund alphas are estimated from the 
regression equation where the coefficients are constrained to 
be positive and to sum to one, and the factors are the style benchmarks given in the first panel by
the 5 GSC style benchmarks and in the second panel by the 11 augmented ITA style categories.  Note
that if the fund’s style is constant over the 12 week estimation period ending in the last date given left
hand column, the factor loadings  are equal to one where fund j belongs to style  J and are zero
otherwise. This constrained regression therefore allows for the possibility of style shift over the
estimation period.
24
Assets under Management
¥0
¥20,000
¥40,000
¥60,000
¥80,000
¥100,000
¥120,000
¥140,000
¥160,000
¥180,000
23-Jan-1998
23-Jul-1998
23-Jan-1999
23-Jul-1999
23-Jan-2000
23-Jul-2000
23-Jan-2001
23-Jul-2001
A
s
s
e
t
s
 
(
B
i
l
l
i
o
n
 
Y
e
n
)
Foreign
Japan
Figure 1:
25
Assets under management by management firm, 
January 23, 1998
Nomura
Daiwa
NikkoPartners
Kokusai
Taiyo
DKA
Nochu
Shin-Wako
IBJ-Daiichi
Nissei
Others
Alliance
Goldman
Invesco
Merrill MAM
Jardine Fleming
Others
Figure 2
This Figure gives the breakdown of assets under management by management company as of January 23, 1998. At that point, total assets
under management amounted to ¥90.17 Trillion. The “Other” category includes all management firms with less than ¥1 Trillion under
management. The “Other” category of Japanese firms managed ¥6.00 Trillion, and includes (in order of assets under management)
management firms Nihon, Sumisei-G, Fuji, Cosmo, Daido-L, Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Sakura, Tokai, Daiwa-Sumigin and Universal. The “Other”
category of foreign firms managed ¥3.74 Trillion, and includes (in order of assets under management) management firms Morgan Stanley,
Fidelity, Deutsche M.G., Schroders, Gurtmore, AIMIC, Barings, Credit Suisse, Rothschild and Maple.
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Figure 3
This Figure gives the breakdown of assets under management by management company as of May 2, 2000. At that point, total assets under
management amounted to ¥138.93 Trillion. The “Other” category includes all management firms with less than ¥1 Trillion under
management. The “Other” category of Japanese firms managed ¥4.28 Trillion, and includes (in order of assets under management)
management firms Daiwa-Sumigin, Daido-L, Asahi-Tokyo, Semisei-G, Sumishin A.M., Asahi Life, Yasuda-Kasai G., Cosmo, Mitsui Marine
A.M., Sanyo, Mitsui Life G, Tokio Marine, Meiji-Dresdner, Mitsubishi Trust, Shinkin and Sawakami. The “Other” category of foreign firms
managed ¥5.83 Trillion, and includes (in order of assets under management) management firms Rothschild, Schroders, Pictet, SSB City,
Frank Russell, AIMIC, JM Morgan Flemming, GE, Gurtmore, Baring, SG Yamaichi, Commerz, UBS, AIG, Scudder, C. Lyonnais, BNP Paribas,
ABN AMRO, HSBC, MFS, State Street, ING, INDOCOM, Prudential-Mitsui, Yasuda PaineWebber (the latter two classified as joint Japanese
foreign ownership).  Note that UFJ Partners includes Partners, Universal and Tokai, and Shinko includes Shin-Wako and Taiyo.
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Assets under management by management firm, 
December 28, 2001
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Figure 4
This Figure gives the breakdown of assets under management by management company as of December 28, 2001. At that point, total assets
under management amounted to ¥113.41 Trillion. The “Other” category includes all management firms with less than ¥1 Trillion under
management. The “Other” category of Japanese firms managed ¥7.26 Trillion, and includes (in order of assets under management)
management firms Mitsubishi Trust, Sumisei-G, Asahi-Tokyo, Chuo-Mitsui AM, Daido-L, Sumitomo Life, Semisei-G, Asahi Life, Shinkin,
Yasuda-Kasai G., Sawakami, Mitsu-Sumitomo Marine A.M, Tokio Marine, Meiji-Dresdner, Mitsui Life G, Sparx, Cosmo, Mitsui Marine A.M.,
Sanyo and Hitachi. The “Other” category of foreign firms managed ¥8.14 Trillion, and includes (in order of assets under management)
management firms Invesco, Schroders, Rothschild, W. Pincus, Pictet, Frank Russell, BNP Paribas, Scudder, Barclays, SG Yamaichi, SSB City,
AIMIC, United AM, Gurtmore, Prudential, Franklin Templeton, JM Morgan Flemming, GE, Credit Agricol, Baring, UBS, State Street,
Commerz, AIG, ING, Mellon, HSBC, MFS, PCA, C. Lyonnais, ABN AMRO, Credit Lyonnais, INDOCOM, Yasuda PaineWebber and
Prudential-Mitsui (the latter two classified as joint Japanese foreign ownership).  Note that UFJ Partners includes Partners, Universal and
Tokai, and Shinko includes Shin-Wako and Taiyo.
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Net Fund Inflow 1998-2001
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Investment Performance of Japanese and foreign firms
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Implied Asset Allocation by Japanese firms
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
20-Mar-1998
20-Sep-1998
20-Mar-1999
20-Sep-1999
20-Mar-2000
20-Sep-2000
20-Mar-2001
20-Sep-2001
Other
CD
Bond
MSCI
Topix
Figure 7
31
Implied Asset Allocation by Foreign Firms
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Japanese funds by GSC styles
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Foreign funds by GSC styles
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Japanese funds and augmented ITA style benchmarks
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Foreign funds and augmented ITA benchmarks
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